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☐ INTERNAL ONLY

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

National Intelligence Estimate - Chile

FROM:

Chief, WHD

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

29 JUL 1990

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Chief, WH

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Declassified and
Approved for Release
July 2000

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29 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Estimate - Chile

1. This memorandum is for background information only.

2. We believe that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Chile as presently written satisfactorily describes what an ALLENDE administration would try to accomplish. What we think is missing is an estimate of his ability to carry out his program if elected. Most logically, this estimate would have followed paragraph 46, page 34, of the NIE.

3. As it is presently written, the NIE points out that in order to carry out his program ALLENDE would have to overcome important obstacles presented by the military (security services included), the Congress, moderate and conservative elements of society, the Catholic Church and labor. We agree that these sectors and others can be expected to resist the basic changes that ALLENDE proposes to introduce into Chilean society, but we do not believe they are insurmountable obstacles. We believe that long-standing democratic traditions in Chile are largely illusory and will have little effect as restraining factors on an ALLENDE administration.

4. The military in Chile traditionally has respected the constitution. We have no information now to indicate that the military will not accept an ALLENDE victory. Indeed, we have the word of General Rene SCHNEIDER, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, that he will accept the decision of the voters or the Congress. The formation of a unified block of officers dedicated to the prevention of a revolutionary Marxist state is not a realistic prospect. The emergence of a field grade officer with leadership qualities around whom anti-Marxist opposition groups could coalesce is a vague hope unlikely to be fulfilled. Although there is an indication that some senior officers feel their way of life will be jeopardized by an

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ALLENDE victory, this sentiment is not evenly distributed nor shared by many younger middle grade officers. If this latter group, consisting of captains and lieutenants, is in any way like its counterpart in other Latin American countries (Peru, Brazil, Panama), they might be expected to support rather than restrain ALLENDE. Further, any group of officers which seeks to restrain an ALLENDE administration, would require backing from the non-commissioned officers who are inclined to be more sympathetic to ALLENDE than to either of the other two candidates.

5. The National Police force is also conditioned to protect the constitutional system irrespective of the political philosophy of the administration. It can be expected to defend the presidency under ALLENDE so long as a facade of constitutionality is retained.

6. The Congress would not be an effective brake on an ALLENDE administration. ALLENDE's political opposition in the Congress would consist of the National Party, remnants of the right wing of the Radical Party and congressmen of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) who are adherents of President FREI. The Popular Unity (UP) forces of ALLENDE now have 82 representatives in a Congress of 200 members. We doubt that there would be a sufficient number of defections from the PDC to the right to prevent the ALLENDE forces from outnumbering their opposition.

7. The resistance from conservative and moderate elements in Chilean society would seem to be a minor obstacle for an ALLENDE administration. ALLENDE has already made it abundantly clear that he plans to nationalize basic resources and enterprises that affect the social and economic development of the country. It is expected that these actions would have broad base appeal and result in the emigration of many conservative and moderate Chileans. Those who remain could be systematically neutralized by an effective campaign citing "their crimes" against the Chilean people.

8. Although the Catholic Church in Chile would prefer either TOMIC or ALESSANDRI as president, there is little evidence that the Church could restrain successfully the

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thrust of an ALLENDE administration. In March 1970 Cardinal Archbishop of Santiago Raul SILVA asked the politicians not to involve the Church in their disputes. When asked what the attitude of the Church would be in the event a Marxist were elected president, SILVA said, "We will think about that when the time comes." In recent years the Church in Chile has played a leading role in the progressive, social action movement within Latin American Catholicism. The Church would have difficulty opposing the "bread and butter" issues that ALLENDE would use to lead the country down the road to a one-party state.

9. The influence that labor would play in assisting or restraining an ALLENDE administration is unclear. The Communist dominated Chilean Workers Central (CUT) called a strike for 8 July 1970. The strike, which was supposed to alert anti-ALLENDE forces that it would be dangerous to interfere with the electoral process in Chile, was largely a failure even though it had the solid support of the highly organized Communist Party of Chile (PCCh). However, it seems reasonable to expect that the combined forces of the Socialist and Communist Parties would make rapid progress in consolidating labor behind ALLENDE while purging those leaders who fail to fall in line.

10. Not to be forgotten is the fact that the PCCh is the largest and best organized Party in Latin America except for Cuba. It is a well-disciplined Party that supports the Soviet Union and, as such, accepts Soviet guidance. The dominant role that the Party has played in the selection of ALLENDE as the Popular Unity candidate and the dominant role it is playing in ALLENDE's campaign leaves little doubt that it expects to play a significant role in an ALLENDE administration.

(Signed) William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH [REDACTED]

(29 July 1970)

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